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This article is a study of cultural memory, focusing on the case of a particular 
constructed memorial site, Yasukuni Shintō Shrine (hereafter, Yasukuni), one of the 
more controversial religious and political sites in Japan. By “cultural memory,” I 
mean a culturally constructed memory in light of needs and agendas of the present. 
It denotes exclusively constructions of the past as they are held by people in the 
given social, cultural, and historical context of the present. I argue that cultural 
memory is the memory through which people in the present use the past to drive an 
agenda in the present. This cultural memory is manifested by rituals or 
performances on special occasions such as commemoration days. What demands 
attention is that cultural memory is not about revealing past events as accurately as 
possible, neither is it necessarily about preserving cultural continuity. Rather it is 
about making “meaningful,” “persuasive,” “true” statements about the past in the 
particular given context of the present. Within this conceptual framework of cultural 
memory, this article demonstrates how the cultural memory of Yasukuni has actively 
constructed the past depending on certain social and cultural milieus of the present.  
 
 
This article sets to explore a particular constructed memorial site, Yasukuni Shintō 
Shrine, one of the more controversial religious and political sites in Japan. In this article, 
I examine the ways the heavily crafted cultural memory of Yasukuni has been designed 
to meet the needs and agendas of the present radical right in Japan. I consider how the 
culturally constructed memory of the controversy of Yasukuni is shaped and 
represented by the shrine itself and its apologists as well as by its affiliated media as a 
tactic to legitimate the right’s claims and to distort wartime memories. I argue that 
Yasukuni functions as a self-perpetuating controversy machine. I am interested in 
investigating what the cultural memory of Yasukuni appeals to and how it does so, how 
it becomes “persuasive” and “true” for different groups of people, and what 
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consequences that way of remembering Yasukuni brings about. Considering these 
questions, I am concerned not with what the content of Yaskuni’s crafted memory of 
the past actually is, but rather with how that content is presented to people, or more 
specifically, how and what people interiorize, forget, and selectively remember. The 
Yasukuni narrative elevates these emotions and memories among others for very 
specific purposes. I examine how the cultural memory of Yasukuni is constructed in an 
attempt to rehabilitate and shape its idealized past. The agenda is that Japan is once 
more an imperial Japan, a glorious empire, united by an imagined Japanese spirit of 
loyalty, self-sacrifice, and pride.  
What I am coming to see about the Yasukuni narrative and controversy is that the 
shrine leadership, in concert with politicians and academics, seeks a younger, 
somewhat destabilized or alienated audience to replace its nearly defunct generation of 
veteran supporters. They do this through the careful orchestration of an array of voices. 
First, I briefly discuss the history of Yasukuni; second, I outline a variety of voices 
used to present Yasukuni to the consuming media and public. I divide these voices into 
a classification of five: the voices from young Japanese, middle-aged Japanese, 
ultra-right wing extremists, bereaved women, and Taiwanese victims of Japanese 
aggression from the war era. I am concerned here with exploring not only the 
possibility of a multiplicity of Yasukunis having complex relations with the shrine 
positively as well as negatively, but, more importantly, also Yasukuni’s attempts to 
manipulate wartime memories and to reestablish the shrine’s idealized past. I am 
provisionally using the metaphor of ventriloquism because I explore how a very 
mystified, almost concealed agent or system of agents manipulates voices that exist in 
many arenas. Yasukuni officials insist, loudly and often, that they say and do nothing 
and that the controversy is beyond their control. “The lady doth protest too much, 
methinks.”1 My discussion here is accompanied by the material below that includes 
examples of most of those voices. Last, I focus on how the voices of Yasukuni’s 
right-wing apologists are manifested through their commemorative performances at the 
shrine on 15 August, the anniversary of the day of surrender. I show that these people, 
who elevate the glory of Japan’s imperial past as well as the heroic war dead and enjoy 
privileged participation in their performances on that day, collude in the shrine’s 
self-performance.  
Additionally, I underscore here an important fact. Most of the voices I discuss were 
not alive during the Second World War. This is a reflection of what Marianne Hirsch 
has called “post memory,” that is to say, people who draw remembered identity from 
events that happened before they were born. I argue that these are the easiest memories 
to manipulate and the agents of Yasukuni know this. 
____________ 
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Brief history of Yasukuni Shrine 
Yasukuni, located near the Imperial Palace in the heart of Tokyo, was originally 
established in 1869, at the request of the Emperor Meiji. Particularly after the end of the 
19th century, the shrine came to be understood as the sacred place for enshrining all the 
spirits of those who lost their lives for the sake of the nation in a series of foreign wars 
that ended with Japan’s defeat in 1945. The spirits enshrined and honored at the shrine 
were all regarded as the heroic spirits who protected the nation. The shrine was 
positioned as the “guardian deity of the nation,” the deity identified with the ancestor 
spirit of the Japanese people. Especially in the 1930s and 1940s, the shrine functioned 
as one source of the spiritual support of Japan’s militaristic nationalism. Currently 
Yasukuni enshrines the spirits of some 2.5 million war dead, including 14 Japanese 
Class-A war criminals as well as an estimated 50,000 Taiwanese and Korean soldiers 
who fought “for the sake of the country.” The Class-A war criminals were the top 
leaders of the Japanese imperial army, including the then Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, 
who were charged with war crimes at the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East from 1946 to 1948. Tōjō was executed on 23 December 1948, but not enshrined 
until 31 years later, in 1979. Today for many Asian countries, Yasukuni is perceived as 
a symbol of Japan’s aggression during the war years. The former Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s tributes to the shrine have sparked vehement protests by those Asian 
countries who were the targets of Japanese military aggression in the war, including 
China, current North and South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Burma. 
 
Typology of voices of Yasukuni memories 
1. Young Japanese voices from newspaper Yasukuni 
Yasukuni Shrine includes in its precincts a large worship hall (haiden and honden) 
as well as a very large museum of the Second World War, called Yūshūkan. A number 
of people leave messages in guest-books that are provided near the exit of the 
Yūshūkan. Scholar John Nelson remarks, “Nowhere does the sanctimonious 
perspective of victimization gain a louder voice than at the Yūshūkan.”2 What catches 
one’s eye on approach is the area in front of the museum where some memorials are 
erected, including memorials of war horses, war dogs, and mothers surrounded by the 
children they raised in spite of the loss of their husbands. These are only a few 
examples that reveal the museum’s concern with getting us to see war mothers as our 
mothers, war dogs as our dogs, and war horses as our horses. Their suffering is ours. 
One can also find the memorial of Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal who was the Asian 
judge at the war crimes tribunal in Tokyo. This memorial denotes Yasukuni’s 
____________ 
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 John Nelson, “Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military Dead 
at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62, 2 (May 2003): 454. 
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admiration for Pal’s views that the Japanese were innocent of all war crimes and that 
the real aggressors in Asia were British and American imperialists.3 The shrine says, in 
other words, that our sacrifice was not in vain. Young visitors to the museum as well as 
to the shrine leave their remarks, which are selectively shown in the shrine’s monthly 
newspaper Yasukuni. 
Type One in the material below shows five statements made by young Japanese. 
One of the common points in these five statements is that the speakers have found the 
occasion of visiting Yasukuni an experience which fosters their nationalist emotions. 
They are encouraged to learn more fully about the view of Japan’s history from what 
the shrine and museum provide, the circumstances of the time, and the importance of 
bolstering a sense of the pride in being Japanese and honoring the spirits of the war 
dead enshrined at the shrine. Their emotional landscape is manipulated to rehabilitate 
and shape Yasukuni’s memory of its idealized past. They are tied to Yasukuni’s crafted 
communal, “historical” memory. In this regard, it is crucial to highlight that the 
newspaper advertises the positive assessment of Yasukuni’s past, precisely through the 
selection of voices whose speakers are thus used as its spokesmen. But it is also 
important to underline that Yasukuni labors to implant in its visitors and others an 
exclusively monolithic war memory of the marvelous war dead and imperial Japan, 
which then stirs up the significance of honoring the war dead and national pride in 
current audiences. Yasukuni performs itself toward the reestablishment of its idealized 
past. 
 
2. Middle-aged Japanese voices from newspaper Yasukuni 
Type Two in the material below shows five statements made by middle-aged 
Japanese. One of the common points among the first four statements is that those voices 
reflect the memories of the dead in specific relation to the writers and, in effect, admire 
and try to rehabilitate a lost Japanese spirit and action that have been forgotten in the 
present. For Yasukuni, this rhetoric of admiration and its rehabilitation is a necessary 
element for shaping the ideals of the shrine. 
There is only one criticism of the memories reported in Yasukuni in the series of the 
newspaper from 1 February 2004 to 1 October 2005. The fifth statement reveals the 
shrine’s concealment of exactly what Japanese imperial forces did during the Second 
World War. Clearly, Yasukuni’s primary task is to produce a selective, revised memory. 
Yasukuni’s selection of voices is exclusively designed to encourage us to proclaim the 
glory of dying for one’s country. It follows two stages: we identify with past sufferers, 
and we then regard “our” suffering as a noble sacrifice. More specifically, it recalls 
Japanese soldiers fighting glorious engagements and dying glorious deaths. We are 
____________ 
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C U L T U R A L  M E M O R Y ,  V E N T R I L O Q U I S M ,  A N D  P E R F O R M A N C E  31 
encouraged to forget the atrocities of war, as they are never mentioned or outright 
denied.  
Yasukuni’s selection of voices for shaping the past can also be found in the case of 
the shrine’s use of actual veteran voices. Here I only briefly mention that the newspaper 
Yasukuni excludes the anti-war claims veterans have made and also the peripheral 
feeling in society that these veterans have recognized and confessed.4  
 
3. Voices from Japanese ultra right-wing extremists 
I turn my attention to the voices of ultra right-wing extremists, a few of whom I 
interviewed at the shrine in January, 2006. A sixty-eight-year-old man, Okuda Ichio, 
whom I interviewed on 1 January, is an excellent case in point of Hirsch’s “post 
memory.” He excitedly recounted the stories of a brave soldier who was a member of a 
spy unit working in China in 1944. I was also told about the passenger-cargo ship, 
Tsushima Maru, which was loaded with about 2,000 people and was sunk by the US 
submarine Bowfin in 1944. Reflecting on these memories of the war as if they were his 
own, Okuda said to me, “I come to Yasukuni more than 200 days in a year and play my 
shamisen here for those who died in the war; of course, I come to Yasukuni on 15 
August every year and pay respect to the war dead who protected the nation.” For 
Okuda, his personal emotion for the war dead functions as the central motivation of his 
performance at the shrine. He has an excess of emotion which he translates into these 
performances. 
However, as Example 1 of Type Three in the material below shows, Okuda, when 
asked about the Second World War and Yasukuni, emphasized the loss of Japanese 
pride, the significance of its rehabilitation, and the shrine as the center of the Japanese 
spirit. As Examples 2 and 3 below show, Okuda’s concerns are also shared with the two 
right-wing members whom I interviewed at the shrine. One of the common points 
among the three interviewees can be found in their desire to reestablish what they are 
calling Japanese spirit, yamato damashii, and hence rehabilitate pride in being Japanese 
by honoring the glorious military dead enshrined at Yasukuni. This desire is precisely 
what the shrine cultivates. Nelson writes, “an array of political action groups labors to 
convert curiosity and empathy into activism and patronage.”5 This manipulation of 
desire is manifested in commemorative performances. In fact, it is these people who 
present what can only be called ritual performances at the commemorative ceremonies 
at the shrine on 15 August. It is these people who engage in paramilitary activities on 
that day at Yasukuni, the activities that actually make the shrine a place of spectacle, 
often ridiculed or worried about in the global press. They act as if they were the 
____________ 
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mainstream of Yasukuni’s history and status during wartime Japan. They act out post 
memory. The shrine, while claiming innocence, manipulates the spectacle. 
 
4. Seemingly timeless bereaved women’s voices 
The fourth type is bereaved women’s voices, which show two cases. Before turning 
to the examples, it is important to point out that Yasukuni has a habit of confusing the 
chronology of deaths and the timeline of events. A 70-year-old widow in 1997 would 
have lost her husband in 1945, the last year of the war, at age 18. Did she not remarry? 
These widows’ voices float ahistorically, set along side the present voices as if they are 
synchronous.  
The first case is the so-called “Yasukuni Wife (yasukuni no tsuma),” or “a bereaved 
woman whose husband is enshrined in Yasukuni.” Example 1 of Type Four in the 
material below shows the case of Iwai Masuko, 83 years old, who submitted a 
statement to the Osaka District Court on April, 2002, against its verdict that the Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s 13 August visit to the shrine in 2001 was unconstitutional. Her 
statement speaks in vindication of Koizami’s tribute at the shrine in an extremely 
emotional tone. This is one case that shows the bereaved family members who have 
deep feelings for Yasukuni.  
The second is a case of mothers whose sons lost their lives in the war. For instance, 
Example 2 in the material shows an excerpt of the conversations by two women, 
Nakamura and Saito. It should be emphasized that their conversations were printed in a 
magazine published in 1939, two years after the Second Sino-Japanese War began.  
These mothers’ grief over losing their sons in the war is overcome by regarding 
their deaths as honorable deaths for the sake of the country. However, this view of 
glorifying the war dead is exactly what Yasukuni repeatedly stressed, that is to say, the 
spiritual bond between the Japanese family and the nation. Nelson points out that “the 
enshrinement of their loved ones and the accompanying rituals conducted in their 
honor must have been ennobling on the one hand […] but agonizing on the other.”6 
However, Nelson does not really explore how the shrine uses these old agonies to 
advance a revised history. Ito Fumiko, a 70-year-old woman, said, “More than 50 years 
have passed, but my grief has not changed,”7 while she came to pay tribute to her 
husband in 1997. Today, Yasukuni officials insist these mothers’ “persuasive” and 
“true” voices are the representative of all bereaved women, parallel with Iwai’s 
powerful voice for the support of the shrine. However, it must be pointed out that while 
Yasukuni removes the ideological nature of those mothers’ voices and thus 
dehistorisizes them to shape its memories in regard to its present agendas, it adopts the 
____________ 
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voice of authority to sell its own rhetoric. This rhetoric fixes those mothers’ voices as 
the authoritative memory of anguish of Yasukuni. In further work, I will explore the 
myriad ways Yasukuni uses the female voice in all documentaries. 
 
5. Taiwanese voices 
Now I turn to a discussion of voices also part of the Yasukuni controversy, but not 
produced or directed by the shrine itself. The memories of Yasukuni among Taiwanese 
are reflected in their lawsuits and protests in Osaka and Tokyo from 2003 to 2005. In 
particular, a group of 236 plaintiffs, including 124 Taiwanese, filed a lawsuit to the 
Osaka District Court in 2003. They sued the state, Prime Minister Koizumi, and 
Yasukuni Shrine over Koizumi’s repeated visits to the shrine, claiming that his visits 
violate Japan’s Constitution, which stipulates the separation of state and religion. In 
addition, these plaintiffs, who also included 111 Japanese and one South Korean 
resident in Japan whose relatives died in the war, demanded 10,000 yen (about $100) 
per plaintiff in compensation for their psychological damage caused by Koizumi’s 
visits to the shrine.8 The Court, however, rejected this lawsuit in 2004, ruling that his 
visits to Yasukuni were private. Although another lawsuit case filed in the Osaka Court 
in 2005 reversed this verdict and ruled that his visits violate the Constitution’s rules 
regarding religion and state, the Court again rejected the Taiwanese plaintiffs’ claims to 
be compensated over the visits. 
One of the noteworthy aspects of this lawsuit is that the suit against Koizumi’s 
Yasukuni visits was the first to involve plaintiffs from Taiwan. Taiwan was under 
Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945. In particular, a group among those 
Taiwanese plaintiffs, led by an independent legislator, Gaojin Sumei (高金素梅), 
constitutes relatives of indigenous Taiwanese who were forcibly conscripted into the 
Japanese military and perished during the war. Gaojin, born in 1965, is not only a 
current lawmaker, but also a descendant of the Atayal (泰雅 ) tribe, one of the 
Taiwanese aborigines. More interestingly, she was an actress in films such as The 
Wedding Banquet in 1991. This Atayal tribe was one of Taiwan’s aboriginal tribes that 
were named by the Japanese colonial government “Takasago people (高砂族)” who 
were recruited as the Takasago Volunteer Army to fight for the Imperial Japanese 
Army in Southeast Asia by 1945. Hence, those Taiwanese plaintiffs also demanded the 
removal of their ancestors’ names as well as other Taiwanese soldiers’ names from the 
shrine’s enshrinement list. As Type Five in the material below shows, Gaojin strongly 
____________ 
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emphasizes that those enshrined indigenous Taiwanese did not fight voluntarily but 
were forced to fight for the Japanese emperor. However, their demands are pending in 
the Osaka Court and a decision has not yet been reached. 
Under these circumstances, the Taiwanese media, including the Taipei Times, 
particularly emphasizes the lawsuit case that made a reversing ruling that Koizumi’s 
visits to the shrine were unconstitutional. It quoted Gaojin’s comments, “We’re not 
satisfied with today’s ruling, though it did take one little step forward. We urge the 
Japanese government to take three or four steps forward,” while in contrast, it also 
introduces Koizumi’s comment, “I don’t understand why my visits to Yasukuni violate 
the Constitution […]. I visit Yasukuni as a private citizen and as prime minister, but not 
in a public capacity.”9  
The Taipei Times also stresses the case that a Taiwanese protest in Tokyo in 2005, 
organized by Gaojin and 60 other members, was prohibited by the Japanese police. It 
states, “A group of Taiwanese Aborigines was forced to cancel a protest over the 
enshrinement of their relatives at the Yasukuni shrine […] after being blocked by 
police outside the shrine’s gate.”10  
However, it is noteworthy that the shrine does use the Taiwan protests to set up its 
counter-memory. The shrine’s audience is not Taiwanese, but Japanese people. A 
Japanese ultra-rightist newspaper Kokumin shinbun, closely allied with Yasukuni, 
quotes a former soldier, Wu Zhengnan (呉正男), born in 1927 and a descendant of the 
Atayal tribe, who states: “Gaojin Sumei is absolutely not the representative of ‘the 
Takasago people.’ She is a disgrace to Taiwanese.”11 It also quotes a man by the name 
of Ke Zhengxin (柯 正信), who criticizes Gaojin and her protest group and states, 
“What is wrong with the emperor, the Prime Minister, and the people with heart to visit 
the shrine which worships the spirits of those who died for the country as loyal 
citizens.” He continues, “Not only do they not appreciate this gratitude, but they 
insulted Yasukuni Shrine, which, itself, says nothing, by demanding compensation. 
They made fools of themselves by taking inhumane action.”12 However, the newspaper 
does not show who the speaker, Ke Zhengxin, is. In fact, Ke’s age, birth place, and all 
other information related to his identity are unclear. Although the Japanese version of 
the internet site, Google, shows a total of 17 hits to this name, all the references refer to 
the Kokumin shinbun article. There is no information about him in other sources like 
the Taipei Times, China Post, and Xinhua News Agency. It thus is possible to argue that 
he is a fringe figure used for political purposes in the Kokumin shinbun to vindicate and 
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justify the issues concerning worship at Yasukuni. It is certainly interesting to think 
that the voices over Yasukuni are completely different even among Taiwanese. But, 
more importantly, this view constitutes evidence that the newspaper creates Taiwanese 
voices in the tactic of ventriloquism it uses to legitimate and justify an imperial Japan, a 
glorious empire, united in a spirit of loyalty and self-sacrifice. The newspaper Kokumin 
shinbun, in its use of ventriloquism, colludes in Yasukuni’s shaping of this idealized 
past.  
 
Ritual performances of the 15 August―commemorations  
at Yasukuni in 2005 
Now my discussion turns to the ritual performances at the 15 August― 
commemorations at Yasukuni in 2005. On 15 August every year, Yasukuni receives 
special attention nationally and internationally. This is the day when many politicians 
pay tribute and when the neighboring Asian countries re-recognize how the Japanese 
government bolsters the glorification of the war dead as well as the country’s imperial 
past. This is also the day when Yasukuni’s ultra-rightist apologists most enjoy 
privileged participation in their commemorative performances at the shrine, addressing 
basic three agendas: supporting the Prime Minister’s worship for the war dead at the 
shrine as his duty; emphasizing the glory of the war dead and Japan’s imperial past; and 
last, re-establishing pride in being the Japanese people. This agenda gets performed in 
many ways. 
On 15 August 2005, the day of the sixtieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the 
Second World War, Professor Jane Marie Law, her thirteen-year-old son, Sam, and I 
visited Yasukuni. We were told in a news report on that night that more than 200,000 
people visited the shrine, even though that day was hit by a heat wave. Under the close 
watch of armed police, what caught my eye on the approach to the shrine was people 
who were handing out pamphlets concerning the disputes of the Second World War, 
the Northern Territories, and the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, 
including pamphlets that provided lessons about how the national identity of Japan and 
Japanese must be firmly established. Protests from opposition groups represented by 
leftists also occurred on this day, but these groups were not allowed on the shrine’s 
precincts. While the shrine maintains that it does nothing to advance these 
demonstrations, the leftists are not allowed inside. In 2005, they were not very visible at 
all. 
A juxtaposition of somber and festive moods composed the atmosphere of that day, 
but I was struck by a number of right-wing members as well as paramilitary members 
who were demonstrating and performing along the shrine’s central walkway toward the 
Main Hall. This scene was indeed what the priest with whom I spoke described to me as 
not performance but rather “costume play.” Those performers include a range of ages 
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and genders, but the vast majority if not all of them clearly had no experiences of the 
war. Those ultra-rightists dressed in military uniforms. Some of them were wearing 
T-shirts with slogans that read “Japanese! Be proud of yourself as a descendent of the 
Yamato tribe,” “15 August is the day of mortification,” and also “Japanese, arm! We 
win next!” Witnessing this, I encountered a scene in which right-wing members 
intimidated a BBC broadcast team filming those militaristic performances, by 
surrounding them and making threatening gestures in the middle of the central 
walkway. We stood nearby and watched. 
Many ultra-rightists were also singing war military songs, playing shamisen, and 
making bugling calls. There were also women dressed in the relief party uniforms of 
the imperial army. What especially caught visitors’ attention was those who put on 
military uniforms, charging with their swords held high, hoisting wartime Japan’s big 
rising sun flag, and marching with the leader’s bark of commands, toward the Main 
Hall. At almost 12 o’clock p.m., I also encountered a group of right-wing members, led 
by an old man. This group took up a position slightly to the right side of the shrine’s 
Main Hall, while the old man sat knelt his heels on the ground and paid respects. 
Meanwhile, his many followers were standing at attention behind him, while some held 
Japan’s national flags, some held a flag that read, “Gather under the Sun flag and unite 
around the emperor,” and some had sashes that read, “Yasukuni Shrine for nation 
protection.” Once the time signal was played at noon, this old man deeply bowed and 
touched his head directly on the ground to worship for the war dead. All of his 
followers, other performers as well as the visitors to the shrine stopped walking and 
offered a silent prayer toward the Main Hall for a minute. It was a moment of absolute 
silence, except for the clicking of cameras. A real Japanese ritual performance.  
In the shade of trees near the Main Hall, we also encountered a scene in which a 
middle-aged paramilitary man, who was wearing a green military uniform and grasping 
Japan’s national flag in his hand, denied the common images of the Nanjing massacre 
in China to a few men and women who stood nearby. He was refuting the brutality of 
the Japanese imperial army in that atrocity. He stated that although people believe that 
Japanese soldiers attacked women and eventually killed them or that they cut the 
pregnant women’s bellies, took out fetuses, and played volleyball with the decapitated 
heads, these things never happened. Instead, he asked us how Japanese people could do 
such things, while he strongly emphasized that we cannot do such things. During a 
period of silence, an elderly woman who was more than eighty suddenly started to 
quarrel with that man about his negation of the Japanese army’s cruel acts in Nanjing, 
by asking if he was a solider. She continued to ask him if he fought in the war. Most 
interestingly, when she vehemently stated that she knew the war and she was there, he 
walked away from her in silence. This situation showed us that the paramilitary man 
talked about the war from the nationalistic pride and revisionist views that distorted and 
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justified the history of Japan’s imperial past and tried to legitimate the status of 
Yasukuni. Although he wore a uniform, he had not been there. 
The 15 August commemorations reveal those performers’ concerns with memory 
and the shaping of Yasukuni’s past. Their displays are all designed to proclaim the 
glory of soldiers dying for the emperor and his country. Participants’ performances 
encourage people to recall the spirit of Japanese soldiers who gloriously fought and 
honorably died, while bearing witness to the glory of imperial Japan. Their 
performances also encouraged people to forget the atrocities of the war, by openly 
stating that they never happened. 
In conclusion, I have seen how the cultural memory of Yasukuni is constructed 
through a variety of ways and, in so doing, focuses on the re-establishment of 
patriotism and heroism of the war dead in glorious imperial Japan. This in itself is the 
consequence of an act of selective memory, for it eliminates the possibility of the 
Japanese imperial army’s aggression and atrocities. To put it in another way, the 
cultural memory of Yasukuni is constructed based on at least four strategies: 1) 
identification of the present generation with the suffering of the war generation through 
the manipulation of “post memory;” 2) the translation of this identification into 
sacrifice for the emperor, and thus a higher, meaningful “cause;” 3) “concealment” of 
atrocity; and 4) the introduction of a “monolithic mnemonic.” This concealment 
distorts the narrative of the war. The monolithic mnemonic actively transforms that 
military nationalism into a positive motif that emphasizes the absolute glory of fighting 
and losing one’s life for the sake of the country. As a consequence, this monolithic 
mnemonic sanitizes traumatic memories with the glorification of imperial Japan and 
the war dead. This strategy, then, brings about historical revisionism as a necessary 
tactic to legitimate that glorification. It justifies the memories of Yasukuni in regard to 
present needs of re-establishing an agenda that Japan is once more an imperial Japan, a 
glorious empire, united in the Japanese spirit of loyalty, self-sacrifice, and pride. 
Yasukuni apologists, who enjoy their privileged participation in commemorative 
ceremonies at the shrine on 15 August and other visitors who support the shrine in this 
issue, have no choice but to collude in Yasukuni’s construction of this monolithic 
idealized past. I wonder if the shrine counts Professor Law, her son Sam, and me, a Zen 
priest, among its “followers.” How many of the 200,000 were the “curious” like us? 
 
The material on typology of voices of Yasukuni memories 
Type One: Young Japanese voices from newspaper Yasukuni 
1. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 January 2003); a 14-year-old boy: 
I visited the Yūshūkan to see combat planes like those named ‘Zerosen’ and ‘Suisei.’ But 
when I saw the other displays, I thought that people in those days devoted themselves to 
fighting for the sake of the country. Today, however, there are few people who are proud of 
our country. Also in general, people write off soldiers as villains. I found a display that 
M A S A K I   M A T S U B A R A  38 
showed Asian countries rejoicing over their emancipation from European invasion and 
colonization by the Japanese army. Did Japan really do only bad things? […] I also thought 
that it’s quite arbitrary of the US to drop A-bombs just for the purpose of making postwar 
dealings more advantageous for itself than for Russia.13  
2. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 July 2003); a 23-year-old man: 
At the Yūshūkan, I keenly felt the great spirit of our ancestors who fought for the sake of the 
country. Currently, there are many politicians, media, and civilian associations for peace, all 
of which have given a look of reproach at the shrine. I really wish they would listen to the 
voices of the heroic war dead, or eirei, enshrined here at the shrine […]. I strongly hope that 
more people, including me, visit and worship at the shrine and learn about the heroic war 
dead at the museum.14  
3. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 July 2003); a 23-year-old man: 
The current young generation conceives of today’s peace, happiness, and prosperity in Japan 
as very natural, and they act arrogantly. We owe today’s peace, happiness, and prosperity to 
the heroic war dead. I feel that the young generation like us must recognize this fact and act 
with more respect and appreciation to them in our everyday life. As long as I see the current 
deplorable state of Japanese youth, politics, and society, I must worry about the deterioration 
of Japan.15 
4. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 November 2005); a 27-year-old housewife: 
Just a hundred year ago, people in Japan protected their own country at the risk of losing 
their lives. I regret that people in today’s Japan do not think their country is important. I also 
regret that Japan nowadays has become a country that receives in silence other countries’ 
interventions […]. After visiting the shrine and its museum, I keenly realized that I want to 
protect and develop Japan by emerging from our own masochistic perspectives and attitudes 
which have increased since the war, and I also want us to be proud of ourselves and our 
country like our great ancestors were a hundred years ago.16 
5. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 November 2005); a 22-year-old woman: 
I recognized anew not only that we are able to live thanks to the heroic war dead who gave 
their precious lives for the sake of the country and their families, but also that we today have 
been able to live peacefully and happily precisely because of the people who struggled in the 
spirit of the heroic war dead to rebuild this country with their strong minds from the poverty 
right from the end of the war to the present. However, today, I think that many people have 
lost their pride as Japanese. I want to live every day keeping in mind always the pride that 
there was in the past and those who came through in the depths of despair with a hope toward 
the future.17 
 
____________ 
13
 “Yūshūkan tomo no kai: kaiin ankēto,” Yasukuni, 1 January 2003, 7. All the information 
reported in this material was translated by myself. 
14
 “Yūshūkan tomo no kai setsuritsu kara ichinen,” Yasukuni, 1 July 2003, 9. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 “Yūshūkan: haikansha no koe,” Yasukuni, 1 November 2005, 11. 
17
 Ibid. 
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Type Two: Middle-aged Japanese voices from the Newspaper Yasukuni 
1. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 September 2004); a 39-year-old man: 
I came to meet my grandfather today […]. I am now a parent, and hence can understand what 
you must have gone through for your family in those days. Please sleep peacefully at the 
shrine. I will devote myself to developing Japan’s peace through education. I will come back 
again. I wish Japan further happiness and success toward the future.18  
2. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 September 2005); a 40-year-old man states: 
In the last sixteen years I have lived in the Kanto area,19 but it was the first time for me to 
worship at the shrine today. I regret how current politics and the media have terribly treated 
Yasukuni Shrine. Today I feel keenly dismayed by the wretchedness and insincerity of Japan 
today. When did we Japanese forget our pure and noble mind that always loved Japan and 
always wished for peace more than anyone else in the world? I feel upset when I see the low 
levels of the recent discussions of Yasukuni. I really feel upset when I think that this current 
situation of Japan has forgotten the Japanese spirit and pride which many of the youth, with 
their futures ahead of them, died trying to protect in the war. Please sleep peacefully. I will 
come back here sometime soon.20 
3. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 October 2005); a 68-year-old man: 
I became sixty-eight years old now, and today was my first time to worship at the shrine. I 
could not stop my tears from so much emotion. Although I do not know my father’s face, I 
know he is enshrined here. Dear father, this is the person I grew up to become. Dear father, 
my mother also died three years ago, and now I am alone. But I now have a happy life. Please 
do not worry about me. I owe this to you.21 
4. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 November 2005); a middle-aged man:  
My grand-uncle died in Okinawa as a kamikaze pilot on 4 May 1945. It was when he was 
still twenty years old. This year, sixty years after the end of the war, I came to Yasukuni 
Shrine to see him. When I went up the escalator and saw the big torii22 of the shrine, I could 
not stop my tears. My grand-uncle’s body is still now in the bottom of the Okinawan sea, but 
I am sure his spirit is here. I will live with pride as a Japanese, succeeding his spirit and mind 
with which he fought to protect the country and his family with his precious life. I believe 
that this is the best way to express my gratitude for him, which I can do in today’s peaceful 
times.23 
5. The newspaper Yasukuni (1 April 2005); a 65-year-old man: 
Japan is small. Nothing changes from the past that this country is poor in natural resources. 
This country had the Sino-Japanese War only thirty-four years after the opening of the 
country and had the Russo-Japanese War two years later. After that, Japan brought about the 
____________ 
18
 “Yūshūkan: haikansha no koe,” Yasukuni, 1 September 2004, 8. 
19
 Kanto area refers to the eastern part of the mainland of Japan, especially six prefectures 
centering on the megalopolis of Tokyo. 
20
 “Yūshūkan: haikansha no koe,” Yasukuni, 1 September 2005, 6. 
21
 “Yūshūkan: haikansha no koe,” Yasukuni, 1 October 2005, 4. 
22
 A torii is a gateway at the entrance to a Shinto shrine. 
23
 “Yūshūkan: haikansha no koe,” Yasukuni, 1 November 2005, 11. 
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painful Pacific War, and even now the country has had lasting issues. It has had difficult 
relations with neighboring countries like China and South Korea. Current Japanese must 
strive to understand the true history of Japan and Yasukuni.24 
Type Three: The voices from ultra right-wing extremists  
1. a) Okuda Ichio, 68 years old; interviewed on 1 January 2006, at the shrine:  
Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and thus the unconditional surrender. But the GHQ 
advanced ‘Japan’s unconditional surrender’ abroad as their part of occupation strategies. 
They completely brainwashed the Japanese people to try to make them lose confidence that 
Japan was a great nation. The Soviet Union was worse. Against the Potsdam Declaration, 
they interned Japanese soldiers in Manchuria and others, forced them to do harsh work, and 
finally killed about 60,000 of them.25 
b) Okuda; interviewed on 2 January 2006, at the shrine: 
Recently, I was interviewed by the media [news channel] Al Jazeera. They asked me, ‘What 
is Yasukuni Shrine for you?’ ‘What does it mean to you?’ I said, ‘You are fools! This is the 
sacred place for us, the Japanese. This is the mosque for you. This is the most sacred place 
for our spirit.’ When I said this, they kept silent.26 
c) Okuda; interviewed on 16 January 2006, at the shrine: 
As a living Japanese today, I must fully realize the cost of precious lives that was paid to 
obtain Japan’s current peace. We are indebted to our ancestors for our presence. I cannot 
thank them enough. How do the glorious spirits see our current situation of Japan, in which 
the people have lost their pride in being Japanese? I really want to do something to change 
this situation. I want to revive Japanese pride.27 
2. An unidentified 58-year-old man with no war experience; a member of a 
right-wing association which he declined to name; interviewed on 1 January 2006, at 
the shrine:  
There was no single Japanese who fought in the Pacific War. The United States just gave it 
that name. Japanese should call this battle ‘The Great East Asia War’ with absolute 
confidence and pride because Japan battled for the sake of the emancipation of Asia from 
Europe, Soviet, America, and others.28  
All Japanese were much grieved to hear of the emperor’s words at noon on 15 August in 
1945. There were many people who killed themselves to take responsibility for the country’s 
defeat and the humiliation to the emperor. As far as we know, more than 700 people killed 
themselves. This must be an unprecedented case in the world history. It is the crystallization 
of yamato damashii, the Japanese spirit, and pride.29 
____________ 
24
 “Yūshūkan: haikansha no koe,” Yasukuni, 1 April 2005, 8. 
25
 This is my interview with him on 1 January 2006. 
26
 This is my interview with him on 2 January 2006. 
27
 This is my interview with him on 16 January 2006. 
28
 This is my interview with him on 1 January 2006. 
29
 This is my interview with him on 1 January 2006. 
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3. An unidentified 52-year-old man with no war experience; a member of another 
right-wing group which he declined to name; interviewed on 1 January 2006, at the shrine: 
Many sacrificed and lost their lives in the battles to protect this Japanese nation and to protect 
families. The act of grieving for these people’s spirits is, for Japanese who are alive today, 
truly a matter of course, and a duty. I regret the current situation in which there are many 
arguments for and against the issue of tribute at Yasukuni because of the intervention of 
other countries. I make no excuses for this situation concerning our ancestors. I even feel 
great shame for the youth who will shoulder Japan’s future. The Yasukuni is nothing but the 
authority and guide of the Japanese spirit.30 
Type Four: Seemingly timeless bereaved women’s voices 
1. Iwai Masuko, 83 years old; in her statement submitted to the Osaka District Court 
on April, 2002, against the ruling that the Prime Minister’s visit is unconstitutional: 
If one is offended by the Prime Minister’s visitation to Yasukuni Shrine, I, as a Yasukuni 
wife, feel millions and billions times more pain in my heart, given that the status of Yasukuni 
Shrine is not officially recognized by the government, nor do the circumstances allow the 
Emperor to officially visit the Shrine to worship. The humiliation to the Yasukuni Shrine is 
millions of times more painful than the humiliation to me, since my husband went to the war 
and died in the battle believing that he would be enshrined. I can never let it happen for my 
beloved husband. Kill me a million times instead of humiliating the Shrine. I can see my 
body all torn, blood gushing from every part of my body, and my blood united with the pool 
of blood shed by the soldiers, when I hear one word of humiliation attached to the Shrine.31 
2. In the account titled Kanrui zadankai, or “the meeting of tears of gratitude,” 
published in the magazine Shufu no tomo (literally, “friends of wives”) in 1939:  
Nakamura: I am deeply grateful that someone like me could have a son to serve the Emperor. 
Saito: [Since my son died in the war], there is nothing to do in my life but visit the Yasukuni 
Shrine to worship the Emperor. I would be content even if I died today. I would die smiling. 
Nakamura: I cannot help feeling lonely when I realize that my son will never return, but he 
died for the country and the Emperor appreciates his sacrifice. I can forget everything and 
feel absolutely happy.32 
Type Five: Taiwanese voices 
Gaojin Sumei (高金素梅); “236 Sue over Visits to Yasukuni,” The Japan Times, 18 
February 2003: 
Yasukuni is a monument to the prewar state Shinto which forced people to revere the 
Japanese emperor against their will. Those Taiwanese enshrined at Yasukuni are claimed by 
the Japanese government to have died for the emperor. This has caused a lot of grief for the 
surviving families, because it ignores the truth, which is that the indigenous Taiwanese did 
not fight voluntarily but were forced to do so.33 
____________ 
30
 This is my interview with him on 1 January 2006. 
31
 Tetsuya Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2005, 13.  
32
 Ibid., 21–4. 
33
 “236 Sue over Visits to Yasukuni,” The Japan Times, 18 February 2003 [online], 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20030218a2.html (04-07-2006).  
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